Introduction
The upgrading of the Transient Reactor Test (TREAT) Facility at ANL-Idaho has been designed to provide additional experimental capabilities for the study of core disruptive accident (CDA) phenomena.1 To imnprove the analytical extrapolation of test results to full-size assembly bundles, the facility upgrade will increase the maximum size of the test bundle from 7 to 37 fuel pins. By creating a core convertor zone around the test location, the neutron spectrum incident on the test assembly will be hardened and the maximum energy deposited in the sample will be increased. In addition, a programmable Automated Reactor Control System (ARCS) will permit high-power transients up to 11,000 MW having a controlled reactor period of from 15 to 0.1 sec. These modifications to the core neutronics will improve simulation of LMFBR accident conditions. Finally, a sophisticated, multiply-redundant safety system , the Reactor Trip System (RTS), will provide safe operation for both steady state and transient production operating modes.
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To insure that this complex safety system is functioning properly, a Dedicated Microprocessor Tester (DMT) has been implemented to perform a thorough checkout of the RTS prior to all TREAT operations. A quantitative reliability analysis of the RTS shows that the unreliability, that is, the probability of failure, is acceptable for a 10 hour mission time or risk interval. Consequently, an automated tester is necessary to complete the RTS checkouts and allow reactor operations within this restricted interval; it is expected that the complete RTS checkout sequence will require less than two hours.
Additionally, the DMT will improve the reliability of the checkout by reducing the potential for gross human error; that is, the DMT will monitor the RTS to verify that the operator responded correctly to each DMT-requested action, e.g., to press a button. Therefore the DMT will both increase the efficiency of the RTS checkout and improve the reliability of the validation.
RTS Description
The basic function of the Reactor Figure 2 ; the quantities in parentheses indicate the number of signals represented by the single line. DMT Block Diagram
The DMT connects to the ARCS central node computer via a serial port. The DMT uses this link to the central node to obtain printer services, to invoke ARCS initiated stimuli, and to obtain nonvolatile storage. Since out-of-limits, the out-of-limits result is printed with a failure message and marked with a flag. In addition, the current page and each subsequent page of the test result printout is marked invalid to s-[gnal that a failure has been detected. Operational procedures requiire the RTS test procedure to be executed from start to finish without a detected failure. Thus when failures are detected, the causes must be corrected and the entire RTS test procedure repeated. Execution of the entire test without failure is necessary to ensure that a corrective action has not inadvertently compromised a part of the RTS tested prior to a failure.
Test Procedures
The methodology of the test procedures is primarily the application of an external stimulus followed by the observation of the system response. Two techniques are employed to assert the initiating stimulus.
In the first, the DMT automatically initiates the stimulus either by enabling a test circuit within the instrument or by injecting an external signal into the instrument's circuits. In the second, the DMT requests the operator to initiate the stimulus, e.g., by pressing a button, and to acknowledge that the action has been completed; when possible, the DMT verifies that the requested action was properly executed. If necessary, the DMT also examines the -state of the instrument prior to the applying the stimulus to insure that all applicable trip circuits have been reset and that the correct operating modes have been established. Two Sof tware verification and validation is an integral, significant factor in the DMT software design, development and testing process. A detailed software specification down to the module level was developed and verified against DMT functional requirements. Software development began after review and acceptance of the specification. Verification during the development phase consisted of review of module and subprogram listings and testing of modules and subprograms.
DMT system testing consists of system verification, validation, reverification, and revalidation phases. The verification and validation phases will be performed with the DMT's program in RAM rather than PROM to facilitate correction of any software problems. In the verification phase the DMT is required to successfully complete a test of an RTS system known to be error free. The validation phase consists of performing an error-seeded test to demonstrate the DMT's ability to detect and announce
RTS failures.
Approximately 300 errors will be sequentially seeded in the RTS to exercise all the DMT's fault detection capabilities.
Upon successful completion of the verification and validation tests, the DMT program will be committed to PROM and software configuration control will commence. The software configuration control requires the documentation of software problems in Software Problem Reports (SPR's) and the documentation of corrective actions or modifications in Software Change Orders (SCO's). An SPR identifies the natuLre of the problem, the conditions under which the problem manifested itself and the name and version number of the module causing the problem. Af ter review of the
